Cuban Missile Crisis

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Histroy

Description

Description

Description

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was perpetually behind in the arms race. To combat this in May of 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev developed the idea of placing nuclear capable intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in Cuba. Cuba agreed to this plan in the hopes that it would help prevent any further attempts of invasion by the United States, such as the attempt in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs. Once Fidel Castro agreed to this plan, building of the missile installations began in secret.

The United States began amassing evidence of the Soviet presence in Cuba in the late June of 1962. Reconnaissance photos showed the presence of Soviet air defense missiles in Cuba and Soviet ships containing IL-28 Beagle medium-range bombers bound for Cuba. Definitive proof of the presence of Soviet IRBM’s was not made until October 15th.

President Kennedy was made aware of the threat on October 16th. In the following week the President, his military advisors, and his Cabinet debated the options open to the United States. Communications were opened with Soviet diplomats, who denied the presence of the missile installations.

The presence of IRBM’s was announced to the public in a television address by President Kennedy on October 22nd. In this announcement, President Kennedy said that any attack on the United States by Cuba would be considered an attack by the Soviet Union and the United States would respond accordingly. President Kennedy also established a naval quarantine on Cuba, in the hopes of preventing any further weapons shipments from the Soviet Union.

Prior to the public announcement, United States armed forces were raised to an elevated alert level in the case of Soviet action. On October 20th, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) placed all aircraft on alert status, making all of them ready to take off, fully loaded, within 15 minutes of any Soviet Action. After the President’s announcement on the 22nd, B-52 heavy bombers began a massive air-borne alert, which involved 24 hour flights in the Caribbean and Atlantic regions. Nuclear capable POLARIS subs were also placed in strategic locations surround Cuba. Kennedy hoped that the military presence would prevent any reckless activity on the part of the Soviet Union.

Communications were exchanged between the two sides on October 23rd and 24th, when Khrushchev sent letters to President Kennedy. The letters spoke of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev stated that the missile installations were there for the purpose of deterrence, not attack. Khrushchev sent another letter on the 26th stating that the Soviet Union would dismantle its missile installations and return them to the Soviet Union in exchange for a United States promise that the U.S. or any of its proxies would not invade Cuba.

Tension reached their peak on the 27th when a U.S. U-2 surveillance aircraft, piloted by Maj. Rudolf Anderson, Jr. was shot down. This prompted roughly 14,000 Air Force reserves to be called to active duty.

That day a final letter arrived from Khrushchev suggesting the Soviets would dismantle the missile installations only if the United States would dismantle their missile installations in Turkey. The U.S. administration chose to ignore the second request and agreed not to invade Cuba if the missiles were disarmed.

On October 28th, the Soviet Government finally agreed to disarm the IRBM’s in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union under United Nations guidelines. Khrushchev also expressed his trust that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. The quarantine of Cuba and increased aerial surveillance continued until October 30th when there was a two day break for U.N. inspectors to visit. Dismantling did not begin until November 2nd and was not complete until November 9th when all 42 missiles and support equipment where shipped back to the Soviet Union.

Modeling the Crisis

Chicken

United States strategies:

1. Naval Blockade: a quarantine of Cuba intended to prevent further shipments of missiles

2. Surgical Air Strike: wipe out missile instalations already present, possibly followed by an invasion

Soviet strategies:

1. Withdrawal of missiles

2. Maintanence of missiles

Description

Two main problems arise with modeling this conflict as a Chicken Game. First, the real life outcome according to this payoff matrix would be the compromise at (3,3) or a blockade by the U.S. and withdrawal by the Soviets, however, this outcome is not a stable one. This compromise gives each side incentive to defect to its harsher strategy. By changing to an air strike strategy, the U.S. would improve its payoff to 4; by changing to a maintanence strategy, the Soviet Union would improve its payoff to 4. The mutually worst outcome (1,1) is also unstable for the same reason.

A second problem with modeling this as a Chicken Game is the presence of shared information and lack of simultaneous play. Both sides went to great lengths during the course of this Crisis to make clear their positions on what was and was not acceptable as a solution to the crisis. Information was continuously conveyed throughout the crisis through concessions and threats. This exchange of information gave each player a better estimate of the reaction of the other player to a given strategy. Additionally, the United States was the first player to make a move by imposing a blockade. The Soviets did not make their move at the same time, but waited to gather information and responded accordingly.

Sequential Bargaining

Steven Brams feels this game is modeled more accurately through the use of sequential bargaining. During the Cuban Missile Crisis neither side opted for an all-or-nothing strategy. Each decision left the door opened for the implementation of alternative strategies based on the other sides response, specifically in the case of failure to respond in the desired manner. Brams took this information and used it to alter the payoff schedule to more accurately represent the Crisis.

The new payoffs are as follows:

1. Blockade/Withdrawal remained the compromise with the payoff (3,3)

2. Blockade/Maintanence changed to become a Soviet victory giving them a payoff of 4 and a U.S. defeat giving them a payoff of 1.

3. Air Strike/Maintanence became a victory for the U.S. leading to a payoff of 4 and a defeat for the Soviet Union giving them a payoff of 1.

4. Air Strike/Withdrawal becomes a "dishonorable" action on the part of the United States, leading to negative international opinion, and leading to a second worst payoff of 2 and it leads to a defeat of the Soviets. However, the negative press recieved by the U.S. gives the Soviets a payoff of 2 in this case.

Description

While sequential bargaining creates a payoff scheme that is more realistic, there is still the problem of unstable outcomes. This game creates a cycle of prefrences. The Soviet Union has incentive to defect from an initial Withdrawal strategy to a Maintanence strategy to gain a payoff of 4. The United States then has incenive to depart to an Air Strike strategy to boost their payoff up to 4. The Soviet Union would then want to change back to a Withdrawal strategy, causing the payoffs to change to (2,2) and also making the United States look bad in the opinion of the world. Finally, The United States would want to resort back to the Blockade at this point, starting the cycle over again.

Theory of Moves

If neither modeling of the game has a stable equilibria, do both models reach a compromise at (3,3)? This can be explained through the rules of play associated with the Theory of Moves and metagames.

Rules of Play

One underlying assumsption of the Theory of Moves is that payoffs do not accrue until play has been terminated.

1. Play begins at an initial set of strategies.

2. Either player is able to change its strategy and by doing so change move from the initial state into a new one, in the same row or column as the initial state. The player who switches is called player l (P1).

3. Player 2 (P2) can now respond by switching its strategy, and in doing so moving the game to a new state.

4. The alternating responses continue until the player (P1 or P2) whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy. When this happens, the game terminates in a final state, which is the outcome of the game.

Termination Rule

5. A player will not move from an initial state if this moves either leads to a less preferred outcome, or returns play to the initial state, making this state the outcome.

Precedence Rule

6. If it is rational for one player to move and the other player not to move from the initial state, the move takes precedence: it overrides staying, so the outcome will be induced by the player that moves.

Description

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