Maoist Insurgency as a Prisoner's Dilemma

The Nepalese Conflict as a prisoner's Dilemma | Reference

The conflict as a 2x2 matrix

• Two distinct warring factions (one partly constitutional and another rebel outfit), two choice games.

• By no means is this representation comprehensive and it only touches one of the many problems associated with peaceful resolution to the uprising.

• Two clear strategies for both: Modify position and Status quo

• Each has a dominating strategy: ‘status quo’. However it serves only one party’s vested interest and is not a popular public choice. Though this keeps them in better position it never wins the hearts of the public, the main factor for whom both party to the conflict claim to be representing and fighting for.

• Another strategy is ‘modify position’: since each side claims that their fight is for the public, both agree that without winning the heart of the public they won’t achieve their goals. Contrary to their fighting strategy the public desire peace and an end to all forms of hostility. So modifying position seems to be the option for both to win the public’s heart.

• The outcome that is generated if both sides agree to go for modify position strategy is termed as “Peace”- a joint cooperation solution, which is a win-win situation for all.

Description

The Payoffs

Though the conflict in Nepal seems to be between two distinct antagonistic forces, the total power to influence each other is distributed among four players. It is a strange phenomenon because two parties are in conflict but four players hold the power key. The two players to the conflict are the Maoists and the government and the remaining two players are the political parties (seven party alliance) and the international community.

The basis for generating payoffs is the relative power each player has to influence each other because none of the players have sole capacity to sway away the whole situation in their favor.

Royal Government

It has power over the country’s security forces, who can use power (mostly military) to subdue people or dissenters. And, the King, who is currently heading the council of ministers, reasserts that his sole aim is to contain the Maoist insurgency. The Royal regime cannot do as it likes because most of the strong influence and opposition from the SPA and the international community. Especially, the international community has a strong influence because all the arms and ammunitions for the security forces is donated by it, particularly the US, India and the UK. So, any halt in the arms aid, which the current situation, directly impacts the security forces ability to withstand the armed opposition from the rebels.

Maoists

They also do not have the total power because their activities are directly influenced by the SPA and the international community. Especially the SPA, after inking the 12-point understanding, has a powerful influence on them. Moreover, the Maoists have been saying that their revolution is against the feudal system that harbors the King and monarchy, and exploits people. So, considering the public sentiment and the pressure from the human rights agencies, they cannot do as they like.

SPA

Though the political parties are sidelined by the King, they nevertheless have a strong influence in the power structure. Based on the last general election they represent over 90 percent of the population. Since the public have been supporting democracy in Nepal, it obviously means that they are lending their full support to the SPA. So, both the gun wielding sides cannot ignore them, though the King has ignored them for quite some time now, creating mayhem and bloodshed. Moreover, the international community have lend full support to the democratic parties and have been time and again urging the King to return back the hijacked democracy back to the people and their legitimate representatives.

International Community

The US, UK, India and the EU and the UN have a huge influence in all the three players. It is because of fear of strong retaliation from the international community the King is not able to impose total ban on the political parties. Obvious, to defuse any situation they have played a major role in Nepal. They had time and again mediated talks between the SPA and the Royal palace. With tools such as finance, aid, loans, military support and access to exclusive privileges, the international community influences the three players and plays a pivotal role in defusing crisis. Even the rebels have committed cooperation with the UN and have been calling for UN mediation in Nepalese conflict.

In this backdrop it is really hard to categorically say who among the four players wield more power in Nepal. Thus, we have divided the total power equally among the four players to find the payoffs for the abovementioned strategies.

Description

As said earlier the basis for the payoffs presented here is the relative power and influence each of the player have on each other. Again, though there are two warring sides, the total power is divided between four parties.

While representing the Cyprus conflict as a PD game, Lumsden (1773) has used a highly dubious method for generating payoffs. By using a modified Self-Anchoring Scale {Originally, this Scale was used by Cantril in 1965. He asked respondents to place themselves now, five years ago and in five years time in the Scale} of a 11-point (0-10) “ladder” he asked respondents to place themselves in the ladder according to where they estimated they would be under four contingencies ( Peace, Taskism, Enosis and War) five years ago, now and in five years time. Generating payoffs based on an empirical data derived from a small number of respondents is not representative. Moreover, giving respondents four strict choices limits people’s perception about the power dynamics in politics and conflict. International community and several political factions inside the country itself can not only play an exogenous interventionist role but also hold power to influence the parties in conflict and the parties with power. Hence, in such a scenario the dynamics is not a one way but a multi-pronged one.

To encompass the power dynamics, relation and influence among the players we adopted a more rational approach and divided the total power equally between four inevitable players despite the conflict between two warring factions. The payoff generation is based on the following basis:

Considering this as a fair trial we have divided the total power equally among the four parties. The maximum power each party can have is 1 and minimum is 0. So, if we consider this as an unbiased trial and power and influence equality among all of the individual parties then each one have a maximum of ¼ power on their own.

Outcomes

Peace: ½, ½

If both the government and the Maoists modify their stances then they both will have the payoff desired by the public. If the government modifies position then it will most probably get wholehearted support from the international community. So its payoff is going to increase from ¼ to ½, keeping it in a much better position.

Similarly, if the Maoists modify their position then they will get full support form the SPA, which has already inked a 12-point Understanding to end the conflict. So, it payoff is also going to increase from ¼ to ½.

War: ¼, ¼

This payoff is the least one, and the least desired too, if both the warring sides stick to status quo. In this situation neither the SPA nor the international community would lend support to the warring parties. After the Royal coup the international community halted (both military and financial) support to the Royal government. The rebels were completely isolated until they changed their stance and forged an alliance with the SPA to end the conflict through an election of constitution assembly. Immediately after the Royal coup this was the situation. However, now the situation seems to be moving towards the other outcomes because of change in the political situation.

Conflict*: 5/8,1/4

If the government changes its position and stance then the international community would lend its full support to the King. Moreover, since the Royal government is a constitutional force (despite seizing power unconstitutionally) and the rebels are not, the SPA has more trust in the King than in the rebels. Hence, the SPA is also going to lend some support to the government in the wake of non-cooperation and non-flexibility from the rebels. So the government is going to have 1/4 +1/4+1/8=5/8 payoff. Meanwhile, the rebels would be completely isolated and will not see any change in their payoff.

Conflict: 5/16, 9/16

If the government sticks to status quo then the SPA will show total non-cooperation. Meanwhile, the international community would be in pressure to withdraw support to the government. It loses support from major countries like the US, UK, EU and India. The UN will never withdraw support. It rather stays neutral in political decision made by the establishment side. Hence, the government would get only one fourth of the international support. Thus the total payoff for the government would be ¼+1/16=5/16.

On the other hand, if the rebels modify their position then they would get support from the SPA and also the international community. Except for the countries like the US, which have a hawkish policy towards any rebel movement, other countries would extend support, though not unflinching. Especially the UN would extend partial support because the rebels have committed compliance of all UN declared rights and issues. So they will have a payoff ¼+1/4+1/16=9/16.

The presented model satisfies a prisoner’s Dilemma because:

• Neither side to the conflict wants war, and it is the least desired outcome by both of them.
• Both sides claim that they want the Peace outcome but are at loggerheads due to their antagonistic stance.
• Both the players in conflict think that peace is more favorable than their own strategies and goals.
• There is no communication between the two warring sides and no compromise seems possible on their own initiation.

With both the sides unable to come to an acceptable conclusion war is the obvious result, which is not the optimal outcome. Moreover, the actions of both these players are in contrast to the rationality concept of mainstream economics. Though both the sides want peace- a rational option and outcome- none are acting accordingly. Rather their choices and strategies are increasingly irrational.

Non-negotiable and non-cooperation game

The Nepalese conflict is a nonnegotiable game and non-cooperation game. Neither conflicting sides show flexibility and have remained adamant on their own position. The only difference is that both the armed players have tried to use the legitimate but sidelined political parties (SPA) to serve their interests. The Royal government argues that there is no military solution of the conflict. However, it has been launching offensive operations, which is quite contrary to its position. In reality, it wants to engage fighting with the Maoists and subdue them with force.

Meanwhile, the Maoists see the monarch as the main hurdle for liberation of Nepali people. So, it wants Nepal to get rid of the monarchy and feudal system. This is highly improbable option because the international community strongly holds the two-pillar theory { In the wake of public demonstrations against the Monarchy itself, the international community is now in pressure to distance itself from this theory and accept what the public want. This is why the US and India, the two countries which had been advocating this theory, have now said that they would acknowledge the public choice. Nevertheless, these counties tacitly support a ceremonial monarch, which they see as a unifying factor in Nepal} of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy in Nepal. However, given sidelining of the parties, they have now agreed to go for election to CA, which will ultimately decide the future of the monarchy. So, the parties still have some place for the King in their model.

Given opposite stances of the rebels and the Royal government, there is no interaction and hence non-negotiable between them. There is also a lack of trust among them. Moreover, each warring side perceive that their strategies and objectives are the best and the only option suitable for the future of Nepal.

This does not mean that there had not been any cooperation attempts to reconcile the two warring sides. In fact, there were two rounds of talks but it did not produce anything substantial because both side blamed each other for violation of ceasefire agreement. Moreover, none of the sides were flexible in the negotiation process. So the deadlock was never broken.

The Nepalese Conflict as a prisoner's Dilemma | Reference