Our Observations: Difference between revisions
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==Our Experiment== | ==Our Experiment== | ||
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'''Tools used''' | '''Tools used''' | ||
We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity | We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity. | ||
To esimate the self-esteem of the participants, we used the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Developed by PhD Morris Rosenberg, SES estimates the orientation towards oneself, based on reflected appraisals, social comparison, self-attriution, and psychological centrality. (You can find a link to the scale on our page). Notice, that SES does not check for narcissistic personality in the way the much more comprehensive Narcissistic Personality Inventory does it. | |||
'''Participants''' | |||
The participant in the experiment were 15 of our classmates from Game Theory, all undergraduate students Economics or Business majors at Dickinson College. We matched them in groups of three, each group having its own resource pool. The groups were kept unchanged in the rounds though the players did not know who they were playing with. | |||
'''Rules''' | |||
Given that | |||
individual effort=q | |||
group total effort=Q | |||
opportunity cost of effort=C | |||
maximum effort=E, | |||
the players had to maximize their individual earnings, knowing that the earnings in a round will be | |||
'''(q/Q)*(A - BQ)Q + (E-q)C''' | |||
if A - BQ < 0, the total value is 0. Notice that this implies that when the players get too greedy, they won't receive anything. | |||
The individual earnings thus increase when q increases, and decrease when Q increases. The participants were not given this knowledge implicitly but developed intution for how the total value is determined after several rounds. | |||
'''Statistical Analysis''' | |||
In deriving the graphs from the spreadsheets, self-esteem was contrasted with the number of effort units taken. In adjusting the Nash equilibrium and calculating self esteem quotients, it was shown that no correlation existed between the two. Also, the amount of money earned was contrasted with self esteem, again showing no real correlation. With the removal of a few outliers, it may also be concluded that a very slight positive correlation exists, with higher self esteem taking more units of effort. | |||
'''Important Conclusions''' | |||
To conclude, a slight positive correlation may exist between units of effort taken, or "greediness," and the level of personal self esteem. No correlation exists between the amount of money and self esteem. These conclusions may have occurred simply because the class was playing to win the game. Self esteem may not have had any correllation because the idea was gaining the most money regardless. Had this been a real life experiment in a village or town, the results may show a much stronger correlation. | |||
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==The Commons Game== | ==The Commons Game== | ||
Latest revision as of 01:39, 7 May 2006
Our Experiment
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis was that there would be a straight correlation between the Self-Esteem Score of the participant and the initial share of the commons he would like to take.
Tools used
We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity.
To esimate the self-esteem of the participants, we used the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. Developed by PhD Morris Rosenberg, SES estimates the orientation towards oneself, based on reflected appraisals, social comparison, self-attriution, and psychological centrality. (You can find a link to the scale on our page). Notice, that SES does not check for narcissistic personality in the way the much more comprehensive Narcissistic Personality Inventory does it.
Participants
The participant in the experiment were 15 of our classmates from Game Theory, all undergraduate students Economics or Business majors at Dickinson College. We matched them in groups of three, each group having its own resource pool. The groups were kept unchanged in the rounds though the players did not know who they were playing with.
Rules
Given that
individual effort=q group total effort=Q opportunity cost of effort=C maximum effort=E,
the players had to maximize their individual earnings, knowing that the earnings in a round will be
(q/Q)*(A - BQ)Q + (E-q)C
if A - BQ < 0, the total value is 0. Notice that this implies that when the players get too greedy, they won't receive anything.
The individual earnings thus increase when q increases, and decrease when Q increases. The participants were not given this knowledge implicitly but developed intution for how the total value is determined after several rounds.
Statistical Analysis
In deriving the graphs from the spreadsheets, self-esteem was contrasted with the number of effort units taken. In adjusting the Nash equilibrium and calculating self esteem quotients, it was shown that no correlation existed between the two. Also, the amount of money earned was contrasted with self esteem, again showing no real correlation. With the removal of a few outliers, it may also be concluded that a very slight positive correlation exists, with higher self esteem taking more units of effort.
Important Conclusions
To conclude, a slight positive correlation may exist between units of effort taken, or "greediness," and the level of personal self esteem. No correlation exists between the amount of money and self esteem. These conclusions may have occurred simply because the class was playing to win the game. Self esteem may not have had any correllation because the idea was gaining the most money regardless. Had this been a real life experiment in a village or town, the results may show a much stronger correlation.
