Our Observations: Difference between revisions
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==Our Experiment== | ==Our Experiment== | ||
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'''Tools used''' | '''Tools used''' | ||
We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity | We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity. | ||
'''Participants''' | '''Participants''' | ||
The participant in the experiment were 15 of our classmates from Game Theory, all undergraduate students Economics or Business majors at Dickinson College. We matched them in groups of three, each group having its own resource pool. | The participant in the experiment were 15 of our classmates from Game Theory, all undergraduate students Economics or Business majors at Dickinson College. We matched them in groups of three, each group having its own resource pool. The groups were kept unchanged in the rounds though the players did not know who they were playing with. | ||
Payoff Parameters: You also specify the range of feasible efforts, the cost of effort and the parameters of the harvest function. In particular, the average harvest (total harvest divided by total group effort) is equal to the intercept parameter minus the slope parameter times total group effort. Let the q represent an individual's effort, Q the group total effort, C the opportunity cost of effort, and E the maximum feasible effort (endowment). Then the individual's earnings in a round would be (q/Q)*(A - BQ)Q + (E-q)C, where q/Q is the share of total effort, (A - BQ)Q is the quadratic total harvest value function, and (E-q)C is the return from the part of the endowment used for non-extraction activities. To avoid negative harvest quantities, the total harvest is constrained to be 0 when A - BQ < 0. | Payoff Parameters: You also specify the range of feasible efforts, the cost of effort and the parameters of the harvest function. In particular, the average harvest (total harvest divided by total group effort) is equal to the intercept parameter minus the slope parameter times total group effort. Let the q represent an individual's effort, Q the group total effort, C the opportunity cost of effort, and E the maximum feasible effort (endowment). Then the individual's earnings in a round would be (q/Q)*(A - BQ)Q + (E-q)C, where q/Q is the share of total effort, (A - BQ)Q is the quadratic total harvest value function, and (E-q)C is the return from the part of the endowment used for non-extraction activities. To avoid negative harvest quantities, the total harvest is constrained to be 0 when A - BQ < 0. | ||
Revision as of 05:17, 5 May 2006
Our Experiment
Hypothesis
Our hypothesis was that there would be a straight correlation between the Self-Esteem Score of the participant and the initial share of the commons he would like to take.
Tools used
We used the Common Pools Game to run a simulation of the Tragedy of the Commons. The Common Pool Resources Experiment was made available by the prominent contemporary economist Charles Holt, professor of Political Economy at the University of Virginia. The experiment represents a multi-person game. Each person is supposed to choose an effort- a resource extraction activity.
Participants
The participant in the experiment were 15 of our classmates from Game Theory, all undergraduate students Economics or Business majors at Dickinson College. We matched them in groups of three, each group having its own resource pool. The groups were kept unchanged in the rounds though the players did not know who they were playing with.
Payoff Parameters: You also specify the range of feasible efforts, the cost of effort and the parameters of the harvest function. In particular, the average harvest (total harvest divided by total group effort) is equal to the intercept parameter minus the slope parameter times total group effort. Let the q represent an individual's effort, Q the group total effort, C the opportunity cost of effort, and E the maximum feasible effort (endowment). Then the individual's earnings in a round would be (q/Q)*(A - BQ)Q + (E-q)C, where q/Q is the share of total effort, (A - BQ)Q is the quadratic total harvest value function, and (E-q)C is the return from the part of the endowment used for non-extraction activities. To avoid negative harvest quantities, the total harvest is constrained to be 0 when A - BQ < 0.
Discussion: The discussion can focus on the extent to which total effort exceeds the socially optimal level, and whether the resource is overused (dissipated) to the extent that the average harvest value is driven down to levels that approximate the opportunity cost of effort. Rent dissipation can be related to externalities, and an appropriate use tax can be discussed. In advanced classes, the efforts can be compared with Nash/Cournot predictions. For a discussion of related experimental economics research, see Holt (2006) Markets, Games, and Strategic Behavior, Chapter 16, and Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) Rules, Games and Common Pool Resources, University of Michigan Press.
rules
statistical analysis
important conclusions
Hypothesis
tools used
participants
rules
statistical analysis
important conclusions
The Commons Game
Self-Esteem Scale
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965)
