Carlos Menem: Difference between revisions

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==='''Barriers to free trade'''===
==='''Barriers to free trade'''===
Argentina began reducing its tariffs in the 1980s. The major trade policy of the 1990s was to participate in setting up the Common Market of the Southern Cone (known as Mercosur) in 1991. Mercosur prohibits trade barriers between member nations on approximately 85 percent of tariff lines and maintains common tariffs and trade barriers against non-members. 29 The bloc--which includes Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay--has significantly altered Argentina's trade relationships. Before Mercosur, Argentina's trade with Brazil averaged approximately 11 percent of its total trade. 30 A year after the preferential trade agreement was signed, 31 Brazil had become Argentina's top trading partner. Last year, trade with Brazil encompassed 26 percent of Argentina's total trade. (See Table 1.)
Argentina began reducing its tariffs in the 1980s. The major trade policy of the 1990s was to set up a common market with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay (known as Mercosur) in 1991. Mercosur prohibits trade barriers between member nations on approximately 85 percent of tariff lines and maintains common tariffs and trade barriers against non-members. Trying to open the market does not go with this trade-bloc strategy. Additionally, the interdependence on trade among members made each country in the bloc highly vulnerable to other countries' economic woes. For example, in 1999 Argentina suffered a 24% decline in exports to Mercosur countries because of Brazil's devaluation against the dollar. For Argentina, Mercosur has functioned as a prison, limiting the country's potential.
If Argentina wanted to open its markets to trade, Mercosur was not the trade strategy to follow. Its high common external tariff (CET) of 14 percent inhibits trade with non-members. 32 The adoption of the CET reduced the government's discretion on trade policy and crippled the ability of consumers to choose from among the best and cheapest products available in the world, while also removing incentives for local producers to innovate and improve in order to remain competitive. Additionally, the interdependence on trade among members 33 made each country in the bloc highly vulnerable to other countries' economic woes. 34 Argentina, for instance, saw a 24 percent decline in exports to Mercosur countries in 1999, largely as a result of Brazil's devaluation of its real against the dollar during its 1999 economic crisis. 35 Interdependence also proves harmful when, in adverse economic circumstances, members refuse to comply fully with their commitments under the bloc. 36 In sum, for Argentina, Mercosur has functioned as a prison, limiting the country's potential to improve living standards.


The problems in Mercosur were aggravated earlier this year when members officially  
The problems in Mercosur were aggravated earlier this year when members officially  

Revision as of 05:45, 4 December 2006

Major Changes

Immediately after being elected, Menem announced major plans to open the economy. During his first presidency, his policies were thought to help the economy to grow and promised a period of prosperity. However, his second presidency showed how unsuccessful these policies were. Argentina entered a deep recession with no hopes.

First Presidency

  • Convertibility Law

In 1991, he created a currency board that proposed the Convertibility Law, which was passed by the Congress. This law made the peso (Argentina currency) convertible with the dollar at a fixed nominal exchange rate, with the domestic monetary base fully backed by the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank. Because of this new currency board system, the government couldn't issue notes without the full support of foreign reserves. Under this law, the government's liabilities could not be payed by printing money. This helped to solve the hyperinflation problem immediately.

  • Privatization of national companies

Between 1990 and 1994, Menem privatized: 1 airlines 2 gas transportation and distribution 3 passenger and cargo railways 4 power generation and distribution 5 telecommunications & the postal service 6 water and sewage systems 7 oil and gas extraction facilities, coal mines, petrochemical plants, steel mills 8 most public banks.

This reduced government consumption since all the state companies left were unproductive and inefficient, and were operating at a loss. By selling all this national patrimony U$S 60,000 million were lost. Two example was YPF (national oil company), Aerolineas Argentinas (national airlines). All the Boeing 707 were sold by only 1 dollar each. Although the companies were released of their debt when sold to foreign companies, the total debt they owed was taken by the government.

  • Deregulation

Menem eliminated price and exchange rate controls, and removed export taxes and import quotas. By deregulating the economy, the cost of doing business drastically decreased and stimulated, so the output increased too.


These policies caused inflation to go down, investment went up too, Argentinians were satisfied. Argentina's annual GDP grew 7.9 % from 1991 to 1994. Gross Investment rose by more than 120%. Poverty fell from 38% in 1989 to 13% in 1994. Unfortunately, this growth was not sustainable.

Just a Promise

Even though there was a huge economic growth in the beginning, this plan of economic liberatization failed and caused a recession that lasted 5 more years. This full economic dependence caused the following problems:

Increasing Debt

Government expenditures grew from 9.4% in 1989 to 21% in 2000. At the same time, GDP growth slowed from 7.9% between 1991 and 1994 to negative growth since mid-1998. Lack of economic growth, combined with increasing government expenditures, generated a fiscal deficit that grew from 0.15% of GDP in 1994 to 2.4% in 2000. To achieve fiscal balance, instead of decreasing its expenditures, it chosed to raise taxes and incurre more debt in financial markets and with the IMF. Raising taxes proved to be a bad tactic; it caused more tax evasion and suffocated the private sector even more.

In 1998, Argentina's per capita debt surpassed that of Korea during the Asian financial crisis. Total Argentine public debt increased from 34% of GDP in 1991 to about 52% in 1999. High debt increases the cost of borrowing money because it increases the perception of investment risk.



Uncertainty over the monetary system

The Convertibility Law dealth with the problem of high inflation. The high value of the peso tied to a strong U.S. dollar cause a lot of problems. The absence of stable reforms generated speculation on the sustainability of the currency board.


Excessive regulation

Most privatization didn't encourage competition, it simply transferred monopolies from the public to the private sector. Argentina's labor system was heavily burdened by excessive regulations that constrain the ability of businesses to adjust to fit market changes, forcing many businesses to ignore labor laws by employing workers outside of the legal system.

Barriers to free trade

Argentina began reducing its tariffs in the 1980s. The major trade policy of the 1990s was to set up a common market with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay (known as Mercosur) in 1991. Mercosur prohibits trade barriers between member nations on approximately 85 percent of tariff lines and maintains common tariffs and trade barriers against non-members. Trying to open the market does not go with this trade-bloc strategy. Additionally, the interdependence on trade among members made each country in the bloc highly vulnerable to other countries' economic woes. For example, in 1999 Argentina suffered a 24% decline in exports to Mercosur countries because of Brazil's devaluation against the dollar. For Argentina, Mercosur has functioned as a prison, limiting the country's potential.

The problems in Mercosur were aggravated earlier this year when members officially forfeited the ability to negotiate free trade agreements on their own. Next year, members will have to give up free trade agreements signed with countries outside the bloc that were negotiated before the bloc's creation. 37 This reflects Mercosur's inherent hostility toward free trade. Brazilian Minister of Development, Industry, and Trade Alcides Tapias provides another example in his criticism of former Argentine Minister of Economy Lopez Murphy's candid support for lowering trade barriers and increasing economic ties through direct negotiations with the United States. Tapias argues that individual countries lack leverage when negotiating with America. 38 In Mercosur, members are increasingly moving away from global free trade policies and abandoning their autonomy to set their own trade policies.

Sources

Australian Goverment Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade



Introduction | Dictatorship | Raúl Alfonsín | Fernando de la Rúa

Interim Presidents | Néstor Kirchner | Graphs | Final Analysis