The Employment Relationship: Difference between revisions

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Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z'').
Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z'').


  The game breaks down as follows: the employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, ''w'', the employee will exert effort ''e''
  The game breaks down as follows the employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, ''w'', the employee will exert effort ''e''





Revision as of 21:06, 22 April 2009

The employment relationship can be basically modeled as followed:

y=y(he)
  • Assumptions:
    1. y' > 0
    2. y'' < 0
    3. h = # of hours worked (assuming 1 hour per worker)
    4. e ∈ [0,1] (Simply, e is the "effort" term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)
    5. ε is an error term with μ=0


Note that e, the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (w), the level of monitoring (m), and an exogenously determined
"next best alternative" we'll call z. Thus, e(w,m;z).

The game breaks down as follows the employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, w, the employee will exert effort e




From this we can easily rearrange terms to get this:





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