The Employment Relationship: Difference between revisions
From Dickinson College Wiki
Jump to navigationJump to search
No edit summary |
|||
Line 11: | Line 11: | ||
Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z''). | Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z''). | ||
The game breaks down as follows | The game breaks down as follows: | ||
#The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, ''w'', the employee will exert effort ''e''. | |||
#At the beginning of the game the employer selects: | |||
*# The wage (''w'') to be payed to the employee | |||
*# The level of monitoring (''m'') | |||
*# A termination probability defined by ''t'' ∈ [0,1] with ''t''<sub>''e'' | |||
Revision as of 21:18, 22 April 2009
The employment relationship can be basically modeled as followed:
- y=y(he)+ε
- Assumptions:
- y' > 0
- y'' < 0
- h = # of hours worked (assuming 1 hour per worker)
- e ∈ [0,1] (Simply, e is the "effort" term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)
- ε is an error term with μ=0
- Assumptions:
Note that e, the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (w), the level of monitoring (m), and an exogenously determined
"next best alternative" we'll call z. Thus, e(w,m;z).
The game breaks down as follows:
- The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, w, the employee will exert effort e.
- At the beginning of the game the employer selects:
- The wage (w) to be payed to the employee
- The level of monitoring (m)
- A termination probability defined by t ∈ [0,1] with te
From this we can easily rearrange terms to get this: