The Employment Relationship: Difference between revisions

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*#  The wage (''w'') to be payed to the employee
*#  The wage (''w'') to be payed to the employee
*#  The level of monitoring (''m'')
*#  The level of monitoring (''m'')
*# A termination probability defined by ''t'' ∈ [0,1] with ''t''<sub>''e'' </sub> < 0  and ''t''<sub>''m'' </sub> >0
*# A termination probability defined by ''t'' ∈ [0,1] with ''t''<sub>''e'' </sub> < 0  and ''t''<sub>''m'' </sub>>0





Revision as of 21:20, 22 April 2009

The employment relationship can be basically modeled as followed:

y=y(he)
  • Assumptions:
    1. y' > 0
    2. y'' < 0
    3. h = # of hours worked (assuming 1 hour per worker)
    4. e ∈ [0,1] (Simply, e is the "effort" term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)
    5. ε is an error term with μ=0


Note that e, the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (w), the level of monitoring (m), and an exogenously determined
"next best alternative" we'll call z. Thus, e(w,m;z).

The game breaks down as follows:

  1. The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, w, the employee will exert effort e.
  2. At the beginning of the game the employer selects:
    1. The wage (w) to be payed to the employee
    2. The level of monitoring (m)
    3. A termination probability defined by t ∈ [0,1] with te < 0 and tm >0




From this we can easily rearrange terms to get this:





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