Maoist Insurgency as a Prisoner's Dilemma: Difference between revisions

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[[Image:Pda2.JPG|thumb|Description]]
[[Image:Pda2.JPG|thumb|Description]]
As said earlier the basis for the payoffs presented here is the relative power and influence each of the player have on each other. Again, though there are two warring sides, the total power is divided between four parties.
While representing the Cyprus conflict as a PD game, Lumsden (1773) has used a highly dubious method for generating payoffs. By using a modified Self-Anchoring Scale  of a 11-point (0-10) “ladder” he asked respondents to place themselves in the ladder according to where they estimated they would be under four contingencies ( Peace, Taskism, Enosis and War) five years ago, now and in five years time. Generating payoffs based on an empirical data derived from a small number of respondents is not representative. Moreover, giving respondents four strict choices limits people’s perception about the power dynamics in politics and conflict. International community and several political factions inside the country itself can not only play an exogenous interventionist role but also hold power to influence the parties in conflict and the parties with power. Hence, in such a scenario the dynamics is not a one way but a multi-pronged one.
To encompass the power dynamics, relation and influence among the players we adopted a more rational approach and divided the total power equally between four inevitable players despite the conflict between two warring factions. The payoff generation is based on the following basis:
Considering this as a fair trial we have divided the total power equally among the four parties. The maximum power each party can have is 1 and minimum is 0. So, if we consider this as an unbiased trial and power and influence equality among all of the individual parties then each one have a maximum of ¼ power on their own.

Revision as of 01:52, 1 May 2006

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The conflict as a 2x2 matrix

  • Two distinct warring factions (one partly constitutional and another rebel outfit), two choice games.
  • By no means is this representation comprehensive and it only touches one of the many problems associated with peaceful resolution to the uprising.
  • Two clear strategies for both: Modify position and Status quo
  • Each has a dominating strategy: ‘status quo’. However it serves only one party’s vested interest and is not a popular public choice. Though this keeps them in better position it never wins the hearts of the public, the main factor for whom both party to the conflict claim to be representing and fighting for.
  • Another strategy is ‘modify position’: since each side claims that their fight is for the public, both agree that without winning the heart of the public they won’t achieve their goals. Contrary to their fighting strategy the public desire peace and an end to all forms of hostility. So modifying position seems to be the option for both to win the public’s heart.
  • The outcome that is generated if both sides agree to go for modify position strategy is termed as “Peace”- a joint cooperation solution, which is a win-win situation for all.


Description


The Payoffs

Though the conflict in Nepal seems to be between two distinct antagonistic forces, the total power to influence each other is distributed among four players. It is a strange phenomenon because two parties are in conflict but four players hold the power key. The two players to the conflict are the Maoists and the government and the remaining two players are the political parties (seven party alliance) and the international community.

The basis for generating payoffs is the relative power each player has to influence each other because none of the players have sole capacity to sway away the whole situation in their favor.


Royal Government

It has power over the country’s security forces, who can use power (mostly military) to subdue people or dissenters. And, the King, who is currently heading the council of ministers, reasserts that his sole aim is to contain the Maoist insurgency. The Royal regime cannot do as it likes because most of the strong influence and opposition from the SPA and the international community. Especially, the international community has a strong influence because all the arms and ammunitions for the security forces is donated by it, particularly the US, India and the UK. So, any halt in the arms aid, which the current situation, directly impacts the security forces ability to withstand the armed opposition from the rebels.

Maoists

They also do not have the total power because their activities are directly influenced by the SPA and the international community. Especially the SPA, after inking the 12-point understanding, has a powerful influence on them. Moreover, the Maoists have been saying that their revolution is against the feudal system that harbors the King and monarchy, and exploits people. So, considering the public sentiment and the pressure from the human rights agencies, they cannot do as they like.

SPA

Though the political parties are sidelined by the King, they nevertheless have a strong influence in the power structure. Based on the last general election they represent over 90 percent of the population. Since the public have been supporting democracy in Nepal, it obviously means that they are lending their full support to the SPA. So, both the gun wielding sides cannot ignore them, though the King has ignored them for quite some time now, creating mayhem and bloodshed. Moreover, the international community have lend full support to the democratic parties and have been time and again urging the King to return back the hijacked democracy back to the people and their legitimate representatives.

International Community

The US, UK, India and the EU and the UN have a huge influence in all the three players. It is because of fear of strong retaliation from the international community the King is not able to impose total ban on the political parties. Obvious, to defuse any situation they have played a major role in Nepal. They had time and again mediated talks between the SPA and the Royal palace. With tools such as finance, aid, loans, military support and access to exclusive privileges, the international community influences the three players and plays a pivotal role in defusing crisis. Even the rebels have committed cooperation with the UN and have been calling for UN mediation in Nepalese conflict.


In this backdrop it is really hard to categorically say who among the four players wield more power in Nepal. Thus, we have divided the total power equally among the four players to find the payoffs for the abovementioned strategies.


Description


As said earlier the basis for the payoffs presented here is the relative power and influence each of the player have on each other. Again, though there are two warring sides, the total power is divided between four parties.

While representing the Cyprus conflict as a PD game, Lumsden (1773) has used a highly dubious method for generating payoffs. By using a modified Self-Anchoring Scale of a 11-point (0-10) “ladder” he asked respondents to place themselves in the ladder according to where they estimated they would be under four contingencies ( Peace, Taskism, Enosis and War) five years ago, now and in five years time. Generating payoffs based on an empirical data derived from a small number of respondents is not representative. Moreover, giving respondents four strict choices limits people’s perception about the power dynamics in politics and conflict. International community and several political factions inside the country itself can not only play an exogenous interventionist role but also hold power to influence the parties in conflict and the parties with power. Hence, in such a scenario the dynamics is not a one way but a multi-pronged one.

To encompass the power dynamics, relation and influence among the players we adopted a more rational approach and divided the total power equally between four inevitable players despite the conflict between two warring factions. The payoff generation is based on the following basis:

Considering this as a fair trial we have divided the total power equally among the four parties. The maximum power each party can have is 1 and minimum is 0. So, if we consider this as an unbiased trial and power and influence equality among all of the individual parties then each one have a maximum of ¼ power on their own.