Carlos Menem: Difference between revisions
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Weakness in the rule of law, coupled with a large bureaucracy, has implemented a culture of corruption. Corruption affects the entire government. 82% percent of people living in Argentina do not trust the effectiveness of the judicial system and therefore do not use it. This distrust doesn't help to sustain economic growth. A weak, non-transparent judicial system raises the cost of doing business and undermines local and foreign investment. By increasing risk, corruption undermines the confidence of citizens and foreign investors alike in undertaking commercial activities, saving, and making long-term investments. | Weakness in the rule of law, coupled with a large bureaucracy, has implemented a culture of corruption. Corruption affects the entire government. 82% percent of people living in Argentina do not trust the effectiveness of the judicial system and therefore do not use it. This distrust doesn't help to sustain economic growth. A weak, non-transparent judicial system raises the cost of doing business and undermines local and foreign investment. By increasing risk, corruption undermines the confidence of citizens and foreign investors alike in undertaking commercial activities, saving, and making long-term investments. | ||
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Argentina also encourages illegal activity through excessive taxation. According to a report by the Latin American Foundation for Economic Research (FIEL), Argentina's informal economy totals an estimated $64 billion annually--equivalent to more that 23 percent of GDP. 41 An estimated $15 billion of this is due to tax evasion. Criticism of efforts to crack down on tax evasion, such as recent comments made by the left-wing Frepaso party president Carlos Alvarez, ignores the fact that tax evasion is primarily a reaction to punitive levels of taxation imposed by the government to finance increasingly burdensome expenditures. 42 The most effective way to reduce tax evasion is to remove incentives to underreport income by lowering the tax burden. 43 IMF demands that Argentina increase its tax revenues by increasing taxes and clamping down on tax evasion demonstrate that officials at the IMF also do not understand this fact. | Argentina also encourages illegal activity through excessive taxation. According to a report by the Latin American Foundation for Economic Research (FIEL), Argentina's informal economy totals an estimated $64 billion annually--equivalent to more that 23 percent of GDP. 41 An estimated $15 billion of this is due to tax evasion. Criticism of efforts to crack down on tax evasion, such as recent comments made by the left-wing Frepaso party president Carlos Alvarez, ignores the fact that tax evasion is primarily a reaction to punitive levels of taxation imposed by the government to finance increasingly burdensome expenditures. 42 The most effective way to reduce tax evasion is to remove incentives to underreport income by lowering the tax burden. 43 IMF demands that Argentina increase its tax revenues by increasing taxes and clamping down on tax evasion demonstrate that officials at the IMF also do not understand this fact. |
Revision as of 05:57, 4 December 2006
Major Changes
Immediately after being elected, Menem announced major plans to open the economy. During his first presidency, his policies were thought to help the economy to grow and promised a period of prosperity. However, his second presidency showed how unsuccessful these policies were. Argentina entered a deep recession with no hopes.
First Presidency
- Convertibility Law
In 1991, he created a currency board that proposed the Convertibility Law, which was passed by the Congress. This law made the peso (Argentina currency) convertible with the dollar at a fixed nominal exchange rate, with the domestic monetary base fully backed by the foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank. Because of this new currency board system, the government couldn't issue notes without the full support of foreign reserves. Under this law, the government's liabilities could not be payed by printing money. This helped to solve the hyperinflation problem immediately.
- Privatization of national companies
Between 1990 and 1994, Menem privatized: 1 airlines 2 gas transportation and distribution 3 passenger and cargo railways 4 power generation and distribution 5 telecommunications & the postal service 6 water and sewage systems 7 oil and gas extraction facilities, coal mines, petrochemical plants, steel mills 8 most public banks.
This reduced government consumption since all the state companies left were unproductive and inefficient, and were operating at a loss. By selling all this national patrimony U$S 60,000 million were lost. Two example was YPF (national oil company), Aerolineas Argentinas (national airlines). All the Boeing 707 were sold by only 1 dollar each. Although the companies were released of their debt when sold to foreign companies, the total debt they owed was taken by the government.
- Deregulation
Menem eliminated price and exchange rate controls, and removed export taxes and import quotas. By deregulating the economy, the cost of doing business drastically decreased and stimulated, so the output increased too.
These policies caused inflation to go down, investment went up too, Argentinians were satisfied. Argentina's annual GDP grew 7.9 % from 1991 to 1994. Gross Investment rose by more than 120%. Poverty fell from 38% in 1989 to 13% in 1994. Unfortunately, this growth was not sustainable.
Just a Promise
Even though there was a huge economic growth in the beginning, this plan of economic liberatization failed and caused a recession that lasted 5 more years. This full economic dependence caused the following problems:
Increasing Debt
Government expenditures grew from 9.4% in 1989 to 21% in 2000. At the same time, GDP growth slowed from 7.9% between 1991 and 1994 to negative growth since mid-1998. Lack of economic growth, combined with increasing government expenditures, generated a fiscal deficit that grew from 0.15% of GDP in 1994 to 2.4% in 2000. To achieve fiscal balance, instead of decreasing its expenditures, it chosed to raise taxes and incurre more debt in financial markets and with the IMF. Raising taxes proved to be a bad tactic; it caused more tax evasion and suffocated the private sector even more.
In 1998, Argentina's per capita debt surpassed that of Korea during the Asian financial crisis. Total Argentine public debt increased from 34% of GDP in 1991 to about 52% in 1999. High debt increases the cost of borrowing money because it increases the perception of investment risk.
Uncertainty over the monetary system
The Convertibility Law dealth with the problem of high inflation. The high value of the peso tied to a strong U.S. dollar cause a lot of problems. The absence of stable reforms generated speculation on the sustainability of the currency board.
Excessive regulation
Most privatization didn't encourage competition, it simply transferred monopolies from the public to the private sector. Argentina's labor system was heavily burdened by excessive regulations that constrain the ability of businesses to adjust to fit market changes, forcing many businesses to ignore labor laws by employing workers outside of the legal system.
Barriers to free trade
Argentina began reducing its tariffs in the 1980s. The major trade policy of the 1990s was to set up a common market with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay (known as Mercosur) in 1991. Mercosur prohibits trade barriers between member nations on approximately 85 percent of tariff lines and maintains common tariffs and trade barriers against non-members. Trying to open the market does not go with this trade-bloc strategy. Additionally, the interdependence on trade among members made each country in the bloc highly vulnerable to other countries' economic woes. For example, in 1999 Argentina suffered a 24% decline in exports to Mercosur countries because of Brazil's devaluation against the dollar. For Argentina, Mercosur has functioned as a prison, limiting the country's potential.
Corruption
Weakness in the rule of law, coupled with a large bureaucracy, has implemented a culture of corruption. Corruption affects the entire government. 82% percent of people living in Argentina do not trust the effectiveness of the judicial system and therefore do not use it. This distrust doesn't help to sustain economic growth. A weak, non-transparent judicial system raises the cost of doing business and undermines local and foreign investment. By increasing risk, corruption undermines the confidence of citizens and foreign investors alike in undertaking commercial activities, saving, and making long-term investments.
Argentina also encourages illegal activity through excessive taxation. According to a report by the Latin American Foundation for Economic Research (FIEL), Argentina's informal economy totals an estimated $64 billion annually--equivalent to more that 23 percent of GDP. 41 An estimated $15 billion of this is due to tax evasion. Criticism of efforts to crack down on tax evasion, such as recent comments made by the left-wing Frepaso party president Carlos Alvarez, ignores the fact that tax evasion is primarily a reaction to punitive levels of taxation imposed by the government to finance increasingly burdensome expenditures. 42 The most effective way to reduce tax evasion is to remove incentives to underreport income by lowering the tax burden. 43 IMF demands that Argentina increase its tax revenues by increasing taxes and clamping down on tax evasion demonstrate that officials at the IMF also do not understand this fact.
These many problems indicate the clear lack of economic freedom that has contributed to Argentina's inability to spur economic growth. This policy of economic protectionism has resulted in recession, a dramatic rise in crime, a high level of unemployment, and a reduction in living standards. 44
Sources
Australian Goverment Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Introduction | Dictatorship | Raúl Alfonsín | Fernando de la Rúa
Interim Presidents | Néstor Kirchner | Graphs | Final Analysis