The Employment Relationship: Difference between revisions

From Dickinson College Wiki
Jump to navigationJump to search
Officerd (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
Officerd (talk | contribs)
No edit summary
Line 12: Line 12:


The game breaks down as follows:
The game breaks down as follows:
#The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, ''w'', the employee will exert effort ''e''.  
*The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, ''w'', the employee will exert effort ''e''.  
#At the beginning of the game the employer selects:  
*At the beginning of the game the employer selects:  
*#  The wage (''w'') to be payed to the employee
#  The wage (''w'') to be payed to the employee
*#  The level of monitoring (''m'')
#  The level of monitoring (''m'')
*# A termination probability defined by ''t'' ∈ [0,1] with ''t''<sub>''e'' </sub> < 0  and ''t''<sub>''m'' </sub>>0
# A termination probability defined by ''t'' ∈ [0,1] with ''t''<sub>''e'' </sub> < 0  and ''t''<sub>''m'' </sub>>0





Revision as of 21:21, 22 April 2009

The employment relationship can be basically modeled as followed:

y=y(he)
  • Assumptions:
    1. y' > 0
    2. y'' < 0
    3. h = # of hours worked (assuming 1 hour per worker)
    4. e ∈ [0,1] (Simply, e is the "effort" term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)
    5. ε is an error term with μ=0


Note that e, the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (w), the level of monitoring (m), and an exogenously determined
"next best alternative" we'll call z. Thus, e(w,m;z).

The game breaks down as follows:

  • The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, w, the employee will exert effort e.
  • At the beginning of the game the employer selects:
  1. The wage (w) to be payed to the employee
  2. The level of monitoring (m)
  3. A termination probability defined by t ∈ [0,1] with te < 0 and tm >0




From this we can easily rearrange terms to get this:





Home