The Employment Relationship: Difference between revisions

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:*#''e'' ∈ [0,1] (Simply, ''e'' is the <nowiki> "effort" </nowiki> term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)  
:*#''e'' ∈ [0,1] (Simply, ''e'' is the <nowiki> "effort" </nowiki> term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)  
:*#ε is an error term with μ=0  
:*#ε is an error term with μ=0  
<br>
 
Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z'').
*Note that ''e'', the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (''w''), the level of monitoring (''m''), and an exogenously determined <br> <nowiki> "next best alternative" </nowiki> we'll call ''z''. Thus, ''e''(''w'',''m'';''z'').





Revision as of 21:29, 22 April 2009

The employment relationship can be basically modeled as followed:

y=y(he)
  • Assumptions:
    1. y' > 0
    2. y'' < 0
    3. h = # of hours worked (assuming 1 hour per worker)
    4. e ∈ [0,1] (Simply, e is the "effort" term and is equal to the amount per hour that a worker actually works)
    5. ε is an error term with μ=0
  • Note that e, the effort exerted by the worker, is a function of the wage (w), the level of monitoring (m), and an exogenously determined
    "next best alternative" we'll call z. Thus, e(w,m;z).


The game breaks down as follows:

  • The employer seeks to maximize profit knowing that for a given wage rate, w, the employee will exert effort e.
  • At the beginning of the game the employer selects:
  1. The wage (w) to be payed to the employee
  2. The level of monitoring (m)
  3. A termination probability defined by t ∈ [0,1] with te < 0 and tm >0




From this we can easily rearrange terms to get this:





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