Modern Day Failure

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Our previous noted analysis of game theory and its applications to war games and international conflicts has led us to draw some conclusions about modern day game theory as applied to the War on Terror.

Our first point that we would like to make is that of the assumption of rationality. The models that were proposed by Bram and Schelling assume the presence of two rational players. This assumption fails when evaluating the War on Terror. In Bram’s and Schelling’s models two players are aware or have a general understanding of the other sides values, goals, and payoffs which are essential for modeling a peaceful resolution to conflict. 

The second point is on deterrence. For the models of the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC), the threat of nuclear war hung over the heads of those involved. This acted to deter the players from defecting from a cooperative strategy. In the current situation, the United States is involved with an enemy that they can not deter with violence.

Additionally, when using these games to model international conflict there is an underlying assumption that one knows who their opponent is and is able to openly communicate with them. This assumption fails in the War on Terror because there is no open communication and the other player is an underground organization.

The focal points used in models for the CMC are not able to be used for the War on Terror. In the case of the CMC both countries were focused on avoiding nuclear war. Therefore the obvious choice was to do whatever was necessary, compromise, to avoid mutual destruction. In the War on Terror, the two players have goals that do not correspond to any agreeable compromise or focal point, there is no obvious choice.

Home | History of Wargames | Cuban Missile Crisis | Modern Day Failure | References