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| Modify position Status quo
| | The Nepalese Conflict as a Prisoner’s Dilemma |
| Modify Position ½, ½ 5/8, ¼
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| Status quo 5/16, 9/16 ¼, ¼
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| Scale: 0 – 1 (1= Peace, 0= Total conflict)
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| Distribution of Influences:
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| Seven Party Alliance (SPA)= ¼
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| King= ¼
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| Maoists= ¼
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| International Community= ¼ (UN= 1/8, and US, India, EU= 1/8)
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| Subsequent Payoffs:
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| 1. Peace ( ½ , ½ ) =Government modifies position and gets support from the International Community. This changes its payoff to :
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| ¼ + ¼ = ½
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| Maoists also modify their position and get support from the Seven Party Alliance. This changes their payoff to:
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| ¼ + ¼ = ½
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| 2. War ( ¼ , ¼ ) = Government maintains Status quo. Payoff remains at ¼ .
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| Maoists maintain Status quo as well. Payoff sticks to ¼ .
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| 3. Conflict* = Government modifies its position. Gains support from the International Community and the Seven Party Alliance. Payoff changes to:
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| ¼ + 1/8 + ¼ = 5/8
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| Maoists maintain Status Quo. Payoff remains at ¼ .
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| 4. Conflict = Government maintains Status quo. Looses half of the International Community support (looses the support from nations such as the US India and the EU) i.e. receive only ½ of 1/8 = 1/16. The payoff changes to:
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| ¼ + 1/16 = 5/16
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| Maoists modify their position and receive support from half of the International Community, namely nations such as the US, India and the EU, and from the Seven Party Alliance. Their payoff changes to:
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| ¼ + 1/16 + ¼ = 9/16
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| | April 25, 2006 |
| | Chandan Sapkota |
| | Baibhav Acharya |
| | Professor Edward McPhail |
| | Game Theory |
Revision as of 23:26, 30 April 2006
The Nepalese Conflict as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
April 25, 2006
Chandan Sapkota
Baibhav Acharya
Professor Edward McPhail
Game Theory
