Breaking the Deadlock
Breaking the deadlock: Changing payoffs
One effective way of making this game a negotiable, cooperative game having a peaceful solution of the crisis is to change the payoffs of the PD game. The best way to break the PD deadlock is to use third party (s) intervention which can influence the warring sides to change their stance and strategies.
Samuel Bowels (2003) presented a good analysis of a generalized situation of how PD can be changed to Chicken game (Assurance game). Bowels’ third party exogenous intervention is not feasible in this game because the party that was supposed to be intervening actually holds some of the power, which directly and indirectly influences the warring faction’s strategies. So, delving into the specifics of a Chicken game is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we will discuss how this game’s payoff can be influenced by the international community and the political parties.
Lumsden (1973) argues that “carrot approach” to conflict resolution can play a vital role in defusing deadlocks. This comes from a third party such as the UN which delivers certain privileges as “carrots” to both the sides to maintain flexibility so that a favorable payoff is attained. In case of nonconformity to any deals, the third party could adopt “stick approach” so that there is no incentive to defect from mutually beneficial deals. One of the most useful enforcer in the global context is the UN. In our context the UN does play a role but it cannot entirely influence the course of action without backing from the US, India and the EU. Rather the combined effort of India, US and the EU through the UN for a military intervention could compel the establishment side and the rebels to break the deadlock. However, Lumsden argues that large-scale military intervention, far from creating the conditions of peace, would increase the level of conflict to significant international dimensions. Hence, this option to change the payoffs is not feasible in Nepal.
