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| =Introduction=
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| | '''Authors:'''<br> |
| | | ''Anastasov, Milen''<br> |
| ===Project Overview===
| | ''Pelteshki, Alex''<br> |
| For our project, we have chosen to deal with the management of the foreign debt of developing countries, an important issue for many countries nowadays. We will use Bulgaria as a basis model and try to build some king of a model showing Bulgaria’s interactions with the World Bank, IMF, and the London Club consequent of the fulfillment of the Brady plan. By linking the negotiation process and all its particular steps to specific results, we will try to create and solve a game model applicable for most counties in debt. We will also try applying the model to other developing countries in Europe and South America in order to test it and change and improve it if necessary. As a type of experiment, we can have a simplified game online, which could be plaid out by the class in order to see how evident each undergone step following the Brady plan is.
| | ''Popov, Kiril''<br> |
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| ===External Debt - Definition===
| | ~Smartest people on Earth! |
| The external debt of a country is the portion of the government debt that is owed to foreign creditors. A large external obligation constitutes a major issue for most developing countries and emerging market economies since it is an obstacle to continued capital acquisition and future economic growth. According to the debt overhang theory, “if debt will exceed the country’s repayment ability with some probability in the future, expected debt service is likely to be an increasing function of the country’s output level. Thus some of the returns from investment by the domestic economy are effectively ‘taxed’ away by existing foreign creditors and investment by domestic and new foreign investors is discouraged.”
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| ===Extenal Debt - Possible Resolutions===
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| An administration facing the issue of a large foreign debt to GDP ratio has three options: 1) to decree a moratorium on debt payments (to discontinue the payments on the debt); 2) to reach an agreement with the creditors to defer the payments on the debt (in this case, an installation plan is created that might cancel some of the payments on the debt or employ that part of the debt as transferred to an equal amount of equity - an action knows as a swap); 3) to negotiate a loan with international financial institutions such as the IMF (International Monetary Fund) or the World Bank that will allow the continuation of payments on the debt.
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| =Cases=
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| ===Eastern Eaurope: Bulgaria===
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| In the case of Bulgaria, a large external obligation was accumulated during the years of the Communist regime. With the fall of Communism in 1989, Bulgaria lost its protected markets in the sphere of agriculture, heavy industry, electronics and information technology. Due to strong international competition from the West and Bulgaria’s large external debt burden, the country was unable to fulfill the service of its debt and Bulgaria’s economy collapsed. As a result, Bulgaria declared a moratorium an all foreign debt payments in 1990. According to the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB), the foreign debt of Bulgaria at that time amounted to over $10 billion, which represented 74% of the country’s GDP. After three years of negotiations with the London Club, on July 28, 1994 Bulgaria signed a contract for the reduction and the restructuring of its foreign debt.
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| This contract was signed under the Brady plan with the following general elements: 1) creditor banks would grant debt relief (cut in principle, or interest payable) in exchange for guarantees on the remaining portion of the debt; 2) loans from the World Bank and the IMF that would be used to finance the guarantees by providing collateral on the reduced value of the debt or by buying back a portion of the debt in ‘cash’ 3) debt relief would have to be linked to some assurance of economic reform that would stimulate investment and the return the flight capital. The logic that underlies the Brady plan is that the reduction of the debt service burden would play both an economic and political role in generating a “credibility shock”. Due to the increased credibility rating of the country in debt, the foreign direct investment increases, thus stabilizing the economy in crisis.
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| Under the Brady contract, Bulgaria negotiated the spread of the debt into four categories: repurchase, Discount Bonds (DISC) (secured with 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds), Front Loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRB) and Interest Arrears Bonds (IAB) (all three types of bonds fall into the general class known as Brady Bonds). Under the repurchase option, the IMF and the World Bank provided Bulgaria with funds to buy 20% of its debt back towards the London Club. The Brady bonds that were issued had a total value of $5.137 billion – 55% of the Bulgarian external debt. Upon the completion of the Brady deal, a country manages to gain the following positive outcomes: first, the national budget is free from the burden of interest payments on an outstanding debt; second, the government has the ability to decrease its foreign obligation through directly purchasing Brady bonds; third, the debtor country has the ability to use the Brady bonds as a form of payment in the privatization process. On the negative side, however, stands the growing interdependency between the government of the country in debt and the international financial organizations (IMF/World Bank). Many critics of the Brady plan believe that the IMF “reflects bargaining power rather than economic circumstances and that it is driven largely by the political self-interests of the Fund’s major shareholders”
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| Furthermore, the IMF has been blamed for the conditions it poses on debtor countries; for example: in return for assistance, the IMF might ask for the elimination of trade barriers, monopolies, or tax distortions. The IMF advocates that such changes are mandatory and beneficial in the long run. However, Kenya’s experience illustrates the contrary. In 1993, Kenya received a small assistance package on the condition that it open-up its financial market system. As a result of the rapid liberalization of the market, there were fourteen banking failures in one year as a state of chaos emerged in the banking system.
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| In 2002, the Bulgarian government decided to trade its Brady bonds for global bonds as a natural continuation of the debt transformation process. Similar swaps had already been performed in some developing Latin American countries such as Argentina and Brazil. “The transformation of Brady bonds into normal credit bonds is the end of ten years of transition. Many developing countries are past the stage of restructuring their bad external debt, and now they are valuable participants in the global economy. That is definitely a sign of success,” Nicholas Brady, the designer of the plan, was quoted saying.
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| The positive results of the debt transformation for the country were immense. The Brady bond swap lead to the following results: the total volume of Brady bonds after the event was reduced to $2,486 million; collateral under the deal of $135 million was released; the debt maturity was extended in time; and probably the most significant impact of the debt transformation – the deal improved the Debt/GDP ratio (exhibit 1) which contributed to the establishment of a new and improved credit profile on the basis of the reconstructed external debt. Furthermore, it was the first time that US dollar denominated Brady bonds were traded for bonds denominated in Euros, differentiating the Bulgarian external debt swap from any other similar transaction made so far.
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| According to Milen Velchev, the Bulgarian Finance Minister at the time of the debt transformation, the fact that the external debt to GDP ratio of the country decreased substantially in the past years, contributed to Bulgaria’s solid international reputation: Bulgaria’s credit rating has been improved 14 different times by the four leading credit rating agencies. “This is unprecedented in the world - I have not heard of another country that has had its credit rating raised so many times in such a period,” said Velchev.
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| As one observes Bulgaria’s foreign debt management, one can see the difficult process through which a developing economy must go through to overcome the burden of a great external debt. Bulgaria’s external debt restructure, however, proves that even though an outstanding debt is a serious economic obstacle, it can be overcome through a well planed fiscal strategy, coordination with creditors, and assistance from foreign institutions. Thus, the country serves as an example to other developing market economies from the region such as Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania.
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| <center>[[Image:Chart.JPG]]</center>
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| ===South America: Argentina===
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| Prior to the Lost Decade of the 1980s, Argentina was a wealthy Latin American nation characterized by a high standard of living, solid technological infrastructure, high literacy and growing GDP. Production declines and poor economic output in the 1980s left Argentina, like many Latin American countries, dealing with outrageous external debts and inflation. Latin America, in the 1990s, adopted several radical changes, headed for liberalization. These changes called for liberalizing trade and privatization. In efforts to stimulate economic growth Argentina negotiated with the IMF, who agreed to short term loan assistance, under the condition that a new government replaces the existing military regime. With the newly elected Raul Alfonsín and support and respect from the U.S., in 1991 Argentina managed to match the peso to the U.S. dollar allowing limited monetary growth strictly to the reserves. The IMF initially supported policies implementing the fixed-currency policy, valuing the rate of one peso to one US dollar (Convertibility Plan).
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| This strategy worked pretty well at the beginning as inflation in Argentina temporarily diminished. Furthermore, up until 1995, the country’s real GDP was growing constantly to reach 7% growth in 1995. Moreover, Argentina was considered an apparent paragon of reform and stabilization. Since 1997, however, both external and internal factors contributed to its steadily declining economic performance which unfolded into the tragedy of 2001.
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| From 1999 onward, economic crises in Mexico, Brazil and several other countries further deteriorated Argentina’s economic conditions. As the US experienced inflation and the dollar devalued, so did the peso. Doubts increased worldwide that Argentina would be able to pay her debts, not to mention, sustain the value of the peso at the value of the U.S. dollar. By 2001 treasuries plummeted, and there were colossal withdrawals from banks, further dwindling consumer and investor optimism. The Argentine government’s plan to attain a "zero deficit", to stabilize the distressed banking system, and to refurbish economic growth was lacking and the country was facing severe economic problems. Its inability to implement reforms and restore growth increased skepticism among critics of Fernando de la Rúa’s administration in 2001. This, combined with well-founded doubts about Argentina's ability to meet its upcoming debt payments, resulted in an economic crisis in November and December 2000.
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| Argentina, often hailed as the model country or the poster child for the IMF, bore out this mantra in 2001, when Argentina declared itself in an economic crisis. There were massive riots, people ransacked the banks, and foreign businesses were attacked. More than thirty died on the streets of Buenos Aires and throughout the country. Argentina for years had sustained massive borrowing from the IMF. Most of the reforms and policies the IMF imposed would have helped to liberalize the economy; however, after “two decades of misguided recommendations and nearly continuous funding, the IMF's involvement in Argentina actually strengthened the power of political vested interests at the expense of economic growth.” The Argentine government tried to halt the recession and repay IMF loans by increasing taxes and decreasing spending. Increasing taxes and decreasing public spending during times of fiscal austerity is devastating to the poor. But the loans from the IMF included deep cuts in government spending so that Argentina would have the ability to repay. So the Argentine government remained steadfast in their commitment to repay the loans, maintain the value of the peso, continue heavy taxation and cut social spending. The IMF backed this strategy claiming that delayed or defaulted debt payments could lead to unstable markets and escalate financial problems in neighboring countries. Unfortunately this ongoing tax and spend policy resulted in severe social consequences: steady declines in industrial production and GDP and staggering unemployment rates.
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| Although the IMF did not explicitly coerce the government to run fiscal deficits, it did not press Argentina authorities hard enough to be more responsible on first place. Not only had that, but it continuously ignored the deficit targets which were not met by Argentina in half of the cases. It either granted waivers, or used to increase the targets in order for the government to be in the limits. Instead of suspending loan packages, the IMF opted to grant additional loans and extend repayment and target deficit dates. The situation deteriorated especially during the second half of 2000 as the recession continued. Analysts became pessimistic and began discussing a possible default on the sovereign debt of the country. At that point in time, Argentina was the largest borrower on the international credit markets. Yet in December 2000 it received an extraordinarily big support, beyond the normal practices of the IMF. Many economists considered this move extremely controversial, as there was almost no chance that Argentina would avoid default on its debt. Defaulting on its sovereign debt, would probably lead to even messier and more costly default – restructuring, leaving Argentina with even greater obligations towards its lenders and creditors. The Fund must have had clear evidence that chances of success were greater than the risks of failure of this transfer, something that was quite dubious at that time. By the summer 2001 this “last resort” was obviously failing, but amazingly, the country enjoyed another $9 billion in loans from the Fund, as the disbursement was the second largest in the history of the Fund. If the December transfer could be described as risky, the 2001 loan “assistance” was insanity. It was already obvious that the catastrophe was inevitable, that another injection had absolutely no chances of relieving the situation, as the best it could do was postponing the catastrophe with three months. This transfer not only did not help the government, it left Argentina with even greater, and what is more, unnecessary burden of obligations.
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| Overall, IMF policies, repeated over and over, did not spur economic growth in Argentina. On the contrary, combined with the Convertibility Plan, they highly overvalued the Argentine peso. People and businesses lost confidence in the currency as the price of sovereign bonds sharply plummeted; they left ongoing inflation, hyper inflation, and high unemployment.
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| Currently, the IMF wants additional procedures intended to augment the federal budget surplus, “thus insuring that international creditors get paid at the expense of the most impoverished layers of society. At the same time, it is demanding that the Argentine government allow the unfettered operation of transnational companies, now poised to exploit the relatively low wages of Argentine workers, by dismantling pension requirements, environmental regulations and severance benefits. But the Kirshner Administration finally lay down the line, and in February 2004 stood up to the IMF due to the poor economic conditions of the country. Surprisingly, the IMF, an institution used to getting its way, stepped down. The IMF uncharacteristically accepted Argentina’s non-compliance to some degree, acknowledging Argentina as a high-profile client. The IMF has been accused of providing poor advice to Argentina and employing a flawed policy of tying the national currency to the dollar. Argentina has been faulted with reckless government spending and failing to restructure debt. Argentina’s current default on $88 billion of debt represents the largest sovereign debt evasion in world history. Also in 2004, the IMF finally “owned up” to causing mistakes in Argentina and admitted their role in plunging half the population in debt.
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| The most critical and emotional controversy regarding Argentina's massive foreign debt surrounds the answer to the following question: which takes priority - paying back foreign debt or aiding the substantial amount of Argentineans currently living in (or near) poverty? The Kirchner administration, which believes that the IMF was the key instigator in Argentina's economic downfall, believes that the impoverished citizens should come first. The opposing critics call for the issuance of IMF growth-linked bonds accompanied by an appropriate repayment plan. But this plan also calls for new "proposals for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism so that troubled countries and creditors can reach agreements. Otherwise, the IMF may find itself needing rescue."
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| It is very important to remember that organizations such as the IMF are neither charity nor non-profit structures. They are profit organizations that look out to maximize their earnings. In that sense, they are not concerned in any way with the personal well-being, since their actions are primarily motivated by their own interests (making sure the obligations will be paid in full), and that was the case with Argentina. Therefore, I would say it is relevant to examine what lessons the Argentine case can teach to other countries currently in relations with the Fund, hopefully to secure less catastrophic outcomes.
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| The Latin American Development Debate, Andrew Zimbalist, Westview Press
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| The IMF-Argentina farce has a good while left to run yet, article published in Financial Times. London (UK): Sep 28, 2004. pg. 18
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| IMF says Argentina's economic recovery continues to be strong, article, published in Emerging Markets Economy. London: Jun 28, 2004. pg. 1
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| Argentina agrees to pay IMF $3B ; Avoids debt default to get fresh funds released, article by James Cox. USA TODAY. McLean, Va.: Mar 10, 2004. pg. B.02
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| IMF-Argentina deal upsets foreign banks, article published in Emerging Markets Economy. London: Apr 8, 2003. pg. 1
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| Economics: Debate: IMF's Argentinian incontinence, article by Duncan Green. The Guardian. Manchester (UK): Feb 10, 2003. pg. 23
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| ===Africa: Nigeria===
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| “Macroeconomic management in Nigeria was the focus last week for legislators, government officials, representative of the media and the private sector, and experts from within Nigeria and abroad, including from the IMF. The conference made a valuable contribution the development of a home-grown economic strategy, particularly relevant after the recent ending of the informal monitoring arrangement between the Nigerian government and the IMF. Yet that announcement has raised many questions about the state of our relationship, so I would like to set the story straight.
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| Nigeria and the IMF are partners, and we have a close and cooperative relationship. We do not always agree-few partners do-but we share a common vision for Nigeria, a vision expressed by President Obasanjo through his leadership in the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD).
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| To its great credit, the government has been increasingly transparent about its relations with the IMF. This can be seen, for example, in the government's decision to publish the details of its August 2000 request for IMF financial support. Last year, the Fund's annual consultation report, which contained the Fund staff's candid assessment of the government's policies, was also publicly disseminated. Indeed, it was very encouraging that this report provoked widespread debate within the country, enhancing the national dialogue on economic policies.
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| The IMF has been criticized for focusing on macroeconomic and related structural policies rather than a broad development agenda. But the policies we propose are geared to-and, indeed, are prerequisites for-achieving developments goals. Financial stability and a vibrant private sector, supported by strong domestic institutions, provide the basis for durable long-term growth and poverty alleviation.
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| The IMF has provided Nigeria with policy advice, technical assistance, and training in its areas of expertise, as well as financial support for policies that will help achieve the country's economic and social objectives. The government economic program that the IMF supported with a $1 billion pledge in August 2000 did achieve some early success. Most notably, inflation was reduced and transparency in the use of public resources was improved. But a big increase in spending in early 2001 fueled a sharp increase in inflation to over 20 percent and widened the differential between the official and parallel exchange rates to over 20 percent, distorting the allocation of resources in the economy.
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| Although the objectives of the program were not met, the government still felt that it would be in the country's best interest to continue the close relationship and remain actively engaged with the IMF. So, in October 2001, the IMF and the government agreed on an informal framework that would monitor the country's economic policies over a six-month period.
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| It was expected that the six-month framework would be the precursor of a broader three-year program to tackle Nigeria's economic problems, fostering growth and reducing poverty. Such a program could have been supported by IMF financing and, by showing consistency in dealing with Nigeria's economic problems, could have been used by the government to support its appeal for debt relief from foreign creditors. However, for the same reasons mentioned above, the objectives of this framework were not achieved.
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| Our concern on excessive spending and distortions in the exchange system are shared by many participants in last week's conference and others throughout Nigeria, but are worth elaborating. First, when oil prices are high, the government-like any household that receives a windfall-should save for a rainy day.
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| But Nigeria has pressing needs: to rehabilitate the infrastructure, strengthen education, improve delivery of medical services, and many others. So the legitimate question is, Why not spend now? But it is vital that spending be calibrated with the government's ability to spend well, and to provide the best value to the people for public resources. If not, the money is wasted: that has been the sad reality of Nigeria's past. That mistake should not be repeated.
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| On the exchange rate, large differentials between the official and parallel exchange rate generate opportunities for corruption, as easy profits can be made "round-tripping" by those with the right to buy dollars at one rate and sell them at the other. This is why it is advisable to aim for a unified exchange system, one that responds to market conditions.
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| Despite these differences, and the ending of the informal monitoring, the IMF and the Nigerian authorities will continue their close relationship. The IMF welcomes the government's invitation to provide its technical expertise, and it will continue to offer technical assistance to develop the skills of Nigerian officials to implement economic policy. The IMF supports the government's resolve to devise a home-grown program, and will also provide advice to aid in its formulation, as we did last week.
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| The democratically elected government inherited deep-rooted economic, social and political problems. Decades of negligence and economic mismanagement led to a prolonged decline in real earnings, rising poverty, deteriorating health indicators, infrastructure decay, and widespread misuse of public resources.
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| The IMF will continue to support efforts by President Obasanjo to provide a brighter future for all Nigerians-indeed, for all Africans, given his role in NEPAD. IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler, who has twice visited Africa during his two years in office and who will come twice more this year, has made clear the IMF's support for Africa and for Nigeria. As Nigeria undertakes the difficult task of building a bridge to the future, the IMF can be counted on for support, as a partner and as a friend”
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| http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/041502a.htm
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| "Oil-rich Nigeria, long hobbled by political instability, corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and poor macroeconomic management, is undertaking some reforms under a new reform-minded administration. Nigeria's former military rulers failed to diversify the economy away from its overdependence on the capital-intensive oil sector, which provides 20% of GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues. The largely subsistence agricultural sector has failed to keep up with rapid population growth - Nigeria is Africa's most populous country - and the country, once a large net exporter of food, now must import food. Following the signing of an IMF stand-by agreement in August 2000, Nigeria received a debt-restructuring deal from the Paris Club and a $1 billion credit from the IMF, both contingent on economic reforms. Nigeria pulled out of its IMF program in April 2002, after failing to meet spending and exchange rate targets, making it ineligible for additional debt forgiveness from the Paris Club. In the last year the government has begun showing the political will to implement the market-oriented reforms urged by the IMF, such as to modernize the banking system, to curb inflation by blocking excessive wage demands, and to resolve regional disputes over the distribution of earnings from the oil industry. In 2003, the government began deregulating fuel prices, announced the privatization of the country's four oil refineries, and instituted the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, a domestically designed and run program modeled on the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility for fiscal and monetary management. GDP rose strongly in 2005, based largely on increased oil exports and high global crude prices. In November 2005, Abuja won Paris Club approval for a historic debt-relief deal that by March 2006 should eliminate $30 billion worth of Nigeria's total $37 billion external debt. The deal first requires that Nigeria repay roughly $12 billion in arrears to its bilateral creditors. Nigeria would then be allowed to buy back its remaining debt stock at a discount. The deal also commits Nigeria to more intensified IMF reviews."
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| http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html
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| =Game Theory Analysis=
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| ===Eastern Europe: Bulgaria===
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| *Will creat a table of positive and negative outcomes resulting from the country's economic decisions.
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| *Will try to devise a game model for all interactions and resulting outcomes.
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| *Will try to solve the game.
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| *Will try and classify the game as a standart game type if possible (depending on the outcome).
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| *Will discuss evolutionary stability, coordination problems, and Pareto efficiency.
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| ===South America: Argentina===
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| *Will creat a table of positive and negative outcomes resulting from the country's economic decisions.
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| *Will try to devise a game model for all interactions and resulting outcomes.
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| *Will try to solve the game.
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| *Will try and classify the game as a standart game type if possible (depending on the outcome).
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| *Will discuss evolutionary stability, coordination problems, and Pareto efficiency.
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| ===Africa: Nigeria===
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| *Will creat a table of positive and negative outcomes resulting from the country's economic decisions.
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| *Will try to devise a game model for all interactions and resulting outcomes.
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| *Will try to solve the game.
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| *Will try and classify the game as a standart game type if possible (depending on the outcome).
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| *Will discuss evolutionary stability, coordination problems, and Pareto efficiency.
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| =Aggregate Model=
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| Here, we are going to develop an aggregate model based on the three area-specific interactions between each country discussed in the Game Theory Analysis section above. Based on what positive and negative outcomes we have found for each country, we are going to develop a model that captures as many strategies as we can witness in real life interaction conserning the managing of the foreing debt of a developing country.
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| *Will creat a table of positive and negative outcomes resulting from the countries' economic decisions on an aggregate level.
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| *Will try to devise a game model for all interactions and resulting outcomes.
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| *Will try to solve the game.
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| *Will try and classify the game as a standart game type if possible (depending on the outcome).
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| *Will discuss evolutionary stability, coordination problems, and Pareto efficiency.
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| =Conclusions=
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| Obviously, once all models have been prepared and analysed, some conlusions will be possible :)
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| =Bibliography=
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| Bird, Graham. The IMF and the Future. New York: Routledge, 2003
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| Claessens, et al., "Analytical aspects of the debt problems of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries," (1996)
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| Foreign Debt Down. http://www.sofiaecho.com/article/foreign-debt-down/id_11294/catid_23.
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| BNB. Gross External Debt. http://www.bnb.bg/bnb/home.nsf/fsWebIndex?OpenFrameset
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| Pirian, Armenuhi. Bulgarian Brady Bonds and the External Debt Swap. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN009285.pdf>.
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| Sachs, Jeffrey. "Making the Brady Plan Work." Foreign Affairs (1989). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890601faessay5962/jeffrey-sachs/making-the-brady-plan-work.html>.
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| Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002
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| United States. U.S. Department of State. Bulgaria Economic Policy and Trade Practices. Feb. 1994. Dec. 2005 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/trade_reports/1993/Bulgaria.html
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