Game Theory Analysis: Difference between revisions
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*Negotiations with the financial institutions => Brady plan (July 28, 1994) + IMF | *Negotiations with the financial institutions => Brady plan (July 28, 1994) + IMF | ||
*Agreeing to the Brady plan conditions => | *Agreeing to the Brady plan conditions => | ||
**Debt relief -> Guarantees needed for remainder of debt | |||
**Guarantees offered by Worl Bank and IMF -> World Bank and IMF effectively own Bulgaria's debt | |||
**Worl Bank + IMF own debt -> WB and IMF can demand specific economic reforms (dependancy) | |||
<br> | <br> | ||
<center>**Increased credibility rating</center> | <center>**Increased credibility rating</center> | ||
Revision as of 05:55, 1 May 2006
Introduction | Cases | Strategy Analysis | Aggregate Model | Conclusion | Sources Used
Eastern Europe: Bulgaria
- $10 billion debt (74% of GDP) => Moratorium on debt payments
- Moratorium on debt payments => Negotiations with the financial institutions (IMF / World Bank)
- Negotiations with the financial institutions => Brady plan (July 28, 1994) + IMF
- Agreeing to the Brady plan conditions =>
- Debt relief -> Guarantees needed for remainder of debt
- Guarantees offered by Worl Bank and IMF -> World Bank and IMF effectively own Bulgaria's debt
- Worl Bank + IMF own debt -> WB and IMF can demand specific economic reforms (dependancy)
- Increased credibility rating => Expected increase in investment (stabilization)
South America: Argentina
