Conclusion

Introduction | Cases | Strategy Analysis | Aggregate Model | Conclusion | Sources Used

Based on the thorough analysis of the cases chosen for this project, our group reached to several conclusions that explain our foreign debt aggregate model.

First, since each case illustrated new and different players, interactions, and outcomes, one could conclude that the management of a county’s foreign obligation is very factor-specific. This means that the utilization of an aggregate model applicable to all similar situations would always be problematic since that model would not have the capacity and complexity to incorporate all important external (international situation, geographical location, etc) and internal factors (political situation, natural resources, country-specific history, etc).

Second, based on the interactions our group explored, the members of our team concluded that history matters in the game played in this instance. This means that the history of previously taken actions matters in evaluating possible outcomes and therefore determines future decisions. Furthermore, there is history involving other players facing similar games and dilemmas which is information that is available to the players and cases that our group explored. If the information is not available to the players, or if they do not take it into account, we found that there is the danger of falling into vicious cycles of decisions (decisions that lead to outcomes that result in the same decisions over again). From the perspective of our project this could be illustrated by a country that decrees a moratorium on its debt payments, negotiates a debt restructuring program with the IMF, however later is unable to comply with the targets set by the Fund and decrees another moratorium again.

Third, based on the oversimplified interaction model that our group created, the conclusion was that both parties in this game (the indebted country and the international financial institutions) would be looking to achieve optimal outcomes through cooperation rather than debt default and sanctions. In this essence, cooperation on both sides would be a stable Nash equilibrium that also is Pareto efficient for both players. However, at this point we have to mention that even though the result of the game we created might seem as an all-win situation that is possible to achieve, in reality due to the factors mentioned above in most cases there is no clear solution to external debt dilemma, or if there is – it is not stable.